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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: EMPLOYMENT AND BENEFITS ISSUES
FOR PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYERS
By, Andrew Malahowski and Jeff Nowak
Andrew Malahowski is compliance counsel at Gallagher Benefit Services, working in Dallas,
Texas. Andrew focuses on all areas of health and welfare plan compliance, including regulatory
compliance under the Affordable Care Act, ERISA, and various employee benefits requirements under
the Internal Revenue Code. Prior to joining Gallagher in March, Andrew was a partner with the law
firm of Franczek Radelet, representing both private and public sector employers in all areas of employee
benefits law. Andrew has been a contributing editor for the Developing Labor Law, and has contributed
articles for the Illinois Public Employee Relations Report and the Employment Law Strategist. He
received his B.A. from the University of Notre Dame, cum laude, in 1999, and his J.D. from the University
of Notre Dame Law School, magna cum laude, in 2002.
Jeff Nowak is a partner with the law firm of Franczek Radelet. Jeff represents private and public
sector management clients in all areas of labor and employment law. He regularly counsels and
litigates single- and multi-plaintiff matters relating to employment discrimination and traditional labor
claims, and has extensive trial experience in the area of employment law. He is considered a national
leader in the areas of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), including counseling clients on compliance with FMLA regulations, conducting FMLA audits and
training, and successfully litigating FMLA and ADA lawsuits. He also is the author of FMLA Insights,
which was named one of the top 100 legal blogs by the ABA Journal for the third consecutive year in
2013. Jeff received his B.A. from Indiana University in 1995, and his J.D. from Indiana University in
1999.

I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2013, the United States Supreme Court struck down part of the
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), a federal law which prevented the federal
government from recognizing same-sex marriages.[1] On November 5, 2013, both
houses of the Illinois General Assembly voted to approve same-sex marriage, and
Governor Quinn signed the bill into law on November 20.[2] The Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Windsor and the action of the Illinois General
Assembly have immediate and long-term administrative compliance issues for
employers and employer-sponsored benefit plans. This article explores some of
the key implications for public sector employers. Part II provides a summary of
the legal rules which governed same-sex unions both in Illinois and elsewhere,
prior to the Court’s decision in Windsor. Part III provides a summary of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor. Part IV provides a summary of the Illinois
Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act, which will permit same-sex
marriage in Illinois. Part V provides a summary of the guidance issued following
the Windsor decision which is relevant for both employee relations and employee
benefit plans in the public sector. We expect additional agency guidance to be
issued in the future concerning same-sex marriages (perhaps even between the
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time this article is written and the time it is published), so legal compliance
remains somewhat of a moving target.
II.

DOMA (PRE-WINDSOR) AND STATE LAWS GOVERNING
SAME-SEX UNIONS

DOMA was enacted in 1996 with two significant sections: (1) Section 2 granted
states the right to refuse recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other
states; and (2) Section 3 amended the definition of “marriage” and “spouse” for all
federal statutes, regulations, and interpretations administered by federal agencies
and entities.[3] Specifically, DOMA defined “marriage” as “only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife,” and defined “spouse” as
“a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”[4] Section 3’s definitions
affected more than 1,000 federal statutes – and their corresponding regulations –
in which marital or spousal status is defined as a matter of federal law.[5]
Prior to the Court’s decision in Windsor, it was clear that neither the Family and
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”),[6] nor the federal rules governing qualified
retirement plans, health and welfare plans,[7] and payroll taxes[8] required the
recognition of same-sex marriages. More to the point, in many cases the
recognition of same-sex marriage was prohibited by DOMA. For example, the
right to provide tax-free health and welfare benefits and the right to provide certain
qualified retirement plan rights were limited to opposite sex spouses under federal
law.[9] Therefore, based on the rules set forth in DOMA, it became common for
employers to simply limit employment and employee benefits rights solely to
opposite sex spouses. For example, it was common for employers to limit health
and welfare plan eligibility to the employee and the employee’s opposite sex spouse
(and any dependent children). When defining eligibility for benefits, employee
benefit plans often specifically referenced DOMA or “federal law” as a rationale
and legal justification for this limitation. Further, FMLA leave was not provided
to employees to care for a same-sex spouse with a serious health condition.
Nevertheless, even prior to the Court’s decision in Windsor, a number of states had
begun to recognize same-sex marriage – even though state law did not control
on issues of federal law. At the time of the Court’s decision in Windsor, the
District of Columbia and 13 states recognized same-sex marriage.[10] On the other
hand, a number of states took opposite measures. Twenty-nine states passed
constitutional bans on same-sex marriage.[11] Many of these states also banned
other types of same-sex unions.[12] Finally, six states and Puerto Rico had
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statutory bans on the recognition of same-sex marriage at the time of
the Windsor decision.[13]
Further, in some states that did not recognize same-sex marriage (including, at
that time, Illinois), other “marriage-like” rights and privileges were extended by
state legislatures. For example, on June 1, 2011, Illinois began recognizing civil
unions in accordance with the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil
Union Act (the “Civil Union Act”).[14] The Civil Union Act allowed both same-sex
and opposite sex couples to enter into civil unions and provide them with the same
legal rights, responsibilities, benefits and protections as are afforded or recognized
under Illinois law to married spouses (e.g., the ability to make emergency medical
decisions for partners, adoption and parental rights, spousal testimonial privilege
and state spousal benefits, including workers’ compensation and spousal pension
coverage).[15] A notable caveat was that the Civil Union Act did not label these civil
unions as a “marriage.” In fact, pursuant to the Civil Union Act, Illinois treated
marriages lawfully performed in another state only as a civil union.[16]
The Civil Union Act spawned sometimes confusing rules with respect to
employment and employee benefits issues – primarily due to the tensions between
state and federal law at the time. For example, the Illinois Department of
Insurance opined that the Civil Union Act had implications for sponsors of fullyinsured employee benefit plans, which are governed in part by the Illinois
Insurance Code. In that guidance, the Department of Insurance took the position
that “health insurance policies and HMO contracts issued in Illinois must offer
coverage to civil union couples and their families that is identical to the coverage
offered to married couples and their families.”[17] Insurance carriers and thirdparty administrators often reached a similar conclusion for governmental health
plans, regardless of whether they were fully-insured or self-insured. In contrast,
private sector self-insured plans were not legally required to cover civil union
partners (though, in practice, many did anyway).
Finally, in the absence of state action (or even in the presence of state action that
didn’t fulfill the employer’s wishes), many employers voluntarily decided to offer
certain rights and benefits to same-sex spouses, domestic partners, and civil union
partners – at least where it was possible to do so. For example, many employers
provided for the right of domestic partners of an employee to enroll in their group
health plans. This often created difficult payroll tax responsibilities for
employers. After all, while opposite sex spouses were permitted to receive tax free
benefits under federal law, domestic partners would only be entitled to receive taxfree benefits if they met the criteria for being “qualified dependents” under the
Internal Revenue Code.[18] Sometimes they did, and sometimes they didn’t. This
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discrepancy led to complicated obligations for employers to “impute” additional
taxable income for certain individuals but not others.
In short, prior to Windsor, the legal landscape could not have been much more
complicated, challenging, and uncertain for employers.
III.

SUMMARY OF THE WINDSOR DECISION

Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor has changed
everything. And hopefully, in time, the Court’s decision will simplify things from
an administrative perspective for employers. In Windsor, the Supreme Court held
in a 5-4 decision that Section 3 of DOMA violated the Equal Protection clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.[19] With the reversal of
Section 3, the Court granted the same benefits and rights under federal law to
same-sex spouses as to opposite sex spouses.
A.

Facts of the Windsor Case

Long-time New York residents Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer registered with the
state as domestic partners in 1993. In 2007, facing Spyer’s ailing health, the couple
married in Ontario, Canada. They returned and continued to reside in New York,
which recognized their marriage at the time Spyer died in 2009.
Spyer left her entire estate to Windsor. The Internal Revenue Service, however,
deemed Windsor ineligible for the marital exemption from the federal estate tax
because of the prohibitions contained in DOMA. As a result, Windsor owed
$363,053 in estate taxes. She paid the tax and requested a refund. The IRS denied
the refund since Windsor did not qualify as a “surviving spouse.”[20]
Windsor sued in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York claiming Section 3 of DOMA violated her Fifth Amendment right to equal
protection. The District Court held Section 3 unconstitutional and ordered the IRS
to refund the tax with interest.[21] The Second Circuit affirmed. The United States
did not comply with the judgment, and the case was appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.[22]
B.

The Supreme Court’s Analysis

The Court traced the history of domestic relations as an area of law left virtually
exclusively to the states.[23] In this context, the Court found that New York’s
decision to recognize same-sex marriages performed outside the state – and
ultimately, its decision to permit same-sex marriages to be performed in New York
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– was a valid exercise of state sovereign power to define and regulate marriage.
The Court characterized New York’s enactments as a determination by New York’s
citizens and elected officials to right an earlier injustice and acknowledge “the
intimate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by the state
worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages.”[24]
The Court acknowledged that, in some circumstances, Congress had enacted
statutes bearing on marital rights and privileges. However, the Court contrasted
Section 3 with these statutes, noting that DOMA had a “far greater reach” and was
“directed to a class of persons that the laws of New York, and of 11 other States,
have sought to protect.”[25] In this regard, the Court found, DOMA diverged from
the history and tradition of relying on state law to define marriage.[26]
Turning to DOMA’s legislative history, the Court found that the “essence” of
DOMA was to interfere with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages.[27] Indeed,
the House of Representatives Report for DOMA expressly stated that “it is both
appropriate and necessary for Congress to do what it can to defend the institution
of traditional heterosexual marriage.”[28] Congress’s goal was to “put a thumb on
the scales and influence a state’s decision as to how to shape its own marriage laws”
for the purpose of imposing inequality, not for other reasons like governmental
efficiency.[29] The Court found that the “bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treatment of that group.”[30]
Finally, the Court noted that DOMA had real-life consequences for certain married
couples. The Court noted, for example, that same-sex spouses were prevented
from obtaining government healthcare benefits they would otherwise receive; were
deprived of special bankruptcy protections for domestic-support obligations; and
could not be buried together in veterans’ cemeteries.[31] Similarly, DOMA
imposed financial burdens on the children of same-sex couples.[32]
Based upon this analysis, the Court invalidated Section 3 of DOMA, and held:
[N]o legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those
whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity. By
seeking to displace this protection and treating those persons as living in marriages less
respected than others, the federal statute is in violation of the Fifth Amendment.[33]

The Court emphasized, however, that its ruling applied only in states that recognize
same-sex marriages.[34] Therefore, the reach of the Windsor decision in all states
– some of which recognize same-sex marriage, and others which do not – remained
somewhat unclear at the time that it was decided.
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IV.

SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN ILLINOIS

The State of Illinois has followed the Windsor decision with action of its own. On
November 5, 2013, Senate Bill 10 (the Illinois same-sex marriage bill) passed out
of the General Assembly and was sent to Governor Pat Quinn for his signature. The
Governor signed SB10 into law on November 20, 2013, and SB10 became Public
Act 98-597 (called the Illinois Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act). The
law’s provisions will go into effect on June 1, 2014, and same-sex couples will be
able to file applications for marriage licenses. Below is a summary of the key
provisions of the Act, including a discussion of some of the law’s ambiguities:
Same-sex marriage provisions: The Act states that, “All [state]
laws…applicable to marriage . . . shall apply equally to marriages of same-sex and
different-sex couples and their children.”[35] The bill removes any distinction
between same-sex and opposite sex marriages for the purpose of any benefits
conferred by state law. In addition, the bill provides that marriage-related terms
such as “spouse,” “family,” “immediate family,” “dependent,” and others apply
equally to same-sex and opposite sex spouses. [36]
Interaction with federal law: The Act also provides that when Illinois
marriage law relies on or refers to federal law, same-sex couples and their children
will be treated as if federal law recognizes the marriages of same-sex couples in the
same manner as the law of the State of Illinois.[37] The bill was first proposed in
the Senate prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor. After
the Windsor decision, however, the effect of this section remains unclear.
Effect on civil unions: Civil unions performed in the state pursuant to the
earlier Civil Union Act will continue to be recognized after the Act has taken
effect. The Act also provides couples currently in a civil union with the opportunity
to “convert” their legal relationship into a marriage, and waives the marriage
license fee for these couples for a period of one year after the Act takes
effect.[38] In other words, until June 1, 2015, couples currently in a civil union may
apply to have their civil union converted into a marriage without paying a fee or
performing a new ceremony. The converted marriage will become effective
retroactively as of the date the civil union was first performed. After June 1, 2015,
couples wishing to convert their civil union into a marriage will have to pay a new
fee, perform a new ceremony, and their marriage date will not be retroactive to the
date of their civil union.
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EMPLOYMENT AND BENEFIT LAW IMPLICATIONS

The law has changed significantly in a short period of time, many interpretation
issues remain, and concise regulatory guidance is hoped for but not yet
promulgated on many fronts. Nevertheless, legal compliance obligations surge
forward anyway. Even for employers who have only one employee who has a samesex spouse – or even if the employer has none today, but might in the future – there
are a number of administrative compliance issues to be aware of. The agency
guidance to date has attempted to simplify compliance to some extent, but some
compliance steps remain educated guesswork. The Court’s decision
in Windsor essentially holds that “a spouse is a spouse,” and the agency guidance
so far largely follows that rough generalization. Nevertheless, understanding all of
the legal ramifications of that conclusion can be difficult.
A.

Federal Agency Guidance Issued To Date

As of the date this article was written, only basic foundational agency guidance has
been released to help interpret the Windsor decision. On August 29, 2013, the
Internal Revenue Service released Revenue Ruling 2013-17 to provide general
guidance on whether, for federal tax purposes, the IRS would recognize a marriage
of same-sex individuals even if the individuals no longer resided in a state that
recognizes same sex marriage.[39] On September 18, 2013, the Department of
Labor published Technical Release 2013-14, which deals with the same question
for ERISA purposes.[40] Subsequently, IRS Notice 2013-61 provided further
guidance on how employees and employers might seek refunds of taxes paid on the
value of same-sex spousal benefits.[41] Finally, the IRS issued Notice 2014-1 to
provide rules for same sex spouses who participate in employer cafeteria plans
(including the payment of pre-tax premiums and contributions to health and
dependent care flexible spending accounts) and health savings accounts.[42]
While a number of questions remain, the primary interpretive question
following Windsor has been answered by this agency guidance – namely, whether
the “state of residence” (i.e., the state where the married couple resides) or the
“state of celebration” (i.e., the state where the marriage was performed)
determines whether a same sex marriage is recognized under federal tax and
benefits law. The agencies have chosen the latter approach, which simplifies
compliance greatly. The DOL and IRS guidance holds that “marriage” includes
same-sex marriages performed in any domestic or foreign jurisdiction, even if the
couple does not currently reside in a state that recognizes same-sex
marriages.[43] Further, in a press release accompanying the release of the DOL’s
ERISA guidance, Labor Secretary Thomas Perez commented, “[The Windsor]
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decision represents a historic step toward equality for all American families, and I
have directed the department’s agency heads to ensure that they are implementing
the decision in a way that provides maximum protection for workers and their
families.”[44] Therefore, further agency guidance on other legal issues
surrounding DOMA is likely to take a similar approach.
B.

Employee Benefit Plan Issues

Unlike private sector employee benefit plans, public sector plans are not governed
by ERISA.[45] However, public sector plans (both health plans and retirement
plans) are governed by tax rules under the Internal Revenue Code which permit
employers to offer certain benefits on a tax-free or tax-deferred basis. Similarly,
group health plans have sometimes complicated payroll taxation consequences for
employee participants, which are now simpler following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Windsor and the subsequent agency guidance. The following sections
summarize the essential compliance steps for employers facing these changes in
the law.
Amend Plan Documents If Necessary

Health and welfare plan documents that offer spousal coverage typically include a
definition of “spouse” for eligibility purposes. As noted above, it was somewhat
common before the Windsor decision for employers to define spouse to exclude
same-sex partners, or to define spouse strictly according to federal law. Now that
a key part of DOMA has been held unconstitutional, and federal regulatory law
has been clarified by the IRS and DOL, old plan definitions may no longer match
the employer’s intent. Or, if the plan’s definition of spouse explicitly references
DOMA, it will not make any practical sense at all. Therefore, plan documents
should be amended so that the plan’s written definition of spouse matches how the
plan will be administered.
Further, while self-insured private sector employers may continue to have freedom
to exclude same-sex spouses from health plan coverage, fully-insured plans and
public sector employers in Illinois likely will not have the same freedom. In light
of the Windsor decision, as well as the statutory recognition of same-sex marriage
in Illinois, we expect both fully-insured plans and all governmental plans in Illinois
to be required to offer the same rights to same-sex spouses as they do to opposite
sex spouses. Further guidance would be welcome as to what is mandated and what
is permissive.
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Determine Employee Marital Status

Employers who offer health plan coverage to spouses will now need to determine
which employees have a legal marriage to a same-sex spouse. This includes
employers who currently offer coverage only to domestic partners rather than
same-sex spouses. It is likely that some employees who have been receiving
coverage for their same sex domestic partner also have a formal marriage to that
partner. On the other hand, some employees will currently meet only the
traditional criteria for domestic partner coverage (joint residence and joint bank
accounts, etc.), but will not have a legally performed marriage to that partner. The
only way the employer can know the answer to this question is to ask, and the
employer has every right to ask so that it can apply the eligibility terms of its health
plan accurately.
Taxation of Benefits Provided to Employees With Same-Sex Spouses

Same-sex spouses are now treated the same as opposite sex spouses have
historically been treated with respect to the taxation of group health plan
benefits. In general, employees are not taxed on the value of group health benefits
provided to their spouse. Further, employer flexible spending account (“FSA”)
plans may reimburse qualified medical expenses for both the employee and the
employee’s spouse (including any qualified dependents). Finally, employees may
pay for the cost of premiums for group health coverage for themselves and their
spouse (and qualified dependents) on a pre-tax basis pursuant to the employer’s
cafeteria plan under Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code. These same
benefits are now available to same-sex spouses after the Supreme Court’s decision
in Windsor and the subsequent guidance issued by the IRS.
Continuing Tax Implications For Non-Spouse Domestic Partners

Even in the wake of Windsor and the Illinois Religious Freedom and Marriage
Fairness Act, some employers may still offer certain benefits to same-sex domestic
partners of their employees. Employers who continue to offer health coverage to
non-spousal domestic partners will continue to have more complicated tax
obligations. The IRS was careful to note that, for federal tax purposes, a spouse
does “not include individuals (whether opposite sex or the same sex) who have
entered into a registered domestic partnership, civil union, or other similar formal
relationship recognized under state law that is not denominated as a marriage
under the laws of that state.”[46]
The Internal Revenue Code permits employers to provide tax-free health benefits
only to employees, their spouses (now including same-sex spouses), children
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under the age of 27, and qualified dependents under Section 105(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code. Individuals who do not fall within one of these categories are not
entitled to receive tax free health benefits. In the case of domestic partners, some
individuals may meet the criteria for being a qualified dependent and others may
not. While a full explanation of these taxation rules is not provided here, generally
a qualified dependent is an individual who: (i) has the same principal place of
residence as the employee and is a member of the employee’s household for the
calendar year; (ii) is provided over one-half of his or her financial support for the
calendar year by the employee.[47] For example, domestic partners who rely on
the employee for financial support and reside with the employee are likely to meet
the criteria for being a qualified dependent; working domestic partners who
provide their own support or who do not meet the criteria would not.
If an employee’s non-marital domestic partner participates in the employer’s
health plan but does not meet the criteria for being a qualified dependent,
additional taxable income must be imputed to the employee. Providing benefits to
a nonqualified dependent is a taxable event. The amount of imputed income must
be the “fair market value” of the nonqualifying coverage, though the exact amount
to impute is not set in stone. In one private letter ruling request to the IRS, COBRA
rates were used as the fair market value of non-dependent domestic partner
coverage. [48] Other informal rulings have followed a similar path. However, the
IRS declined to expressly rule on the appropriateness of this valuation method,
citing its policy of not ruling on fact issues such as the determination of fair market
value. More recently, the IRS noted informally at an ABA Joint Committee on
Employee Benefits meeting that it “declines expressing an opinion on how fair
market value is determined.”[49] Many employers use COBRA rates (minus the
2% administrative charge) as the fair market value of coverage for purposes of
imputed income, but other approaches are permissible.
Due to the complications provided by these rules, we expect that most employers
will decide to remove domestic partner coverage from their employee benefit plans
in favor of simply providing coverage to spouses (including same-sex
spouses). After all, the original rationale for providing domestic partner coverage
no longer exists because same-sex couples will have opportunities, even in Illinois,
to get a legal marriage and secure tax free benefits. Nevertheless, a smooth
transition is recommended. It would cause a significant amount of upheaval for
employees if domestic partner coverage was removed with no advance lead time,
such as time to actually get a legal marriage so that benefit eligibility can be
preserved. Therefore, employers who remove domestic partner benefits in favor
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of same-sex spousal benefits should consider providing advance notice to their
employees and a delayed effective date for such action.
COBRA Continuation Rights

The rules governing COBRA continuation coverage are memorialized in both the
Internal Revenue Code and ERISA. However, the Code’s COBRA provisions are
inapplicable to governmental plans[50], and ERISA’s COBRA provisions are also
inapplicable to governmental plans.[51] Nevertheless, COBRA continuation
obligations still extend to governmental employers pursuant to the Public Health
Service Act (“PHSA”).[52] While formal guidance would be welcome, it is expected
that COBRA continuation rights for same-sex spouses will also apply to
governmental employers under the PHSA. Therefore, if a public employer
provides group health coverage to same-sex spouses and that spouse experiences
a qualifying event under COBRA (for example, divorce from the employee or the
employee’s termination of employment), a notice of continuation rights should be
provided and continuation of health benefits should be permitted for the same-sex
spouse pursuant to the PHSA.
Retirement Plans

All of the obligations for qualified retirement plans following Windsor are not yet
clear, but some guidance has begun to emerge. In a Q&A released following
Revenue Ruling 2013-17, the IRS announced that “[a] qualified retirement plan
must treat a same-sex spouse as a spouse for purposes of satisfying the federal tax
laws relating to qualified retirement plans.”[53] The IRS also stated that it intends
to issue further guidance on how qualified retirement plans and other tax-favored
retirement arrangements must comply with Windsor, including guidance on plan
amendment requirements and any necessary corrections relating to plan
operations for periods before this guidance is issued. As of the date that this article
was written, we are still awaiting this additional guidance.
Pending additional guidance, we expect that the following rules will apply at a
minimum to qualified retirement plans in the public sector: (1) statutory public
sector plans which are governed by the Illinois Pension Code will likely be required
to offer their existing spousal benefits, such as survivor annuities and death
benefits, to same-sex spouses; (2) non-statutory public sector plans may not be
subject to the same mandate, though many employers will choose to equalize
benefits for both same-sex and opposite sex spouses and broad plan definitions of
“spouse” may lead to that conclusion as well; (3) plans must allow same-sex
widows of employees to make direct rollovers of the employee’s accrued and vested
benefit to their own IRA or eligible retirement plan in the same way that opposite
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sex spouses can; (4) required minimum distributions under Section 401(a)(9) of
the Internal Revenue Code must take into account the life expectancy of the
participant and his or her spouse (whether that spouse is same-sex or opposite
sex); (5) benefits may be transferred to a divorced same-sex spouse pursuant to a
valid Qualified Illinois Domestic Relations Order. Other rules affecting qualified
retirement plans in the private sector (which are governed by ERISA and
additional rules under the Internal Revenue Code which are unique to ERISAcovered plans) may not apply to public sector plans. Concise agency guidance,
differentiating between ERISA plans and governmental plans, would be welcome.
C.

Employment Law Issues

The primary impact that Windsor will have on federal employment law concerns
the FMLA. The FMLA allows an eligible employee to take leave in order to care for
a spouse with a serious health condition; because of any qualifying exigency arising
out of the fact that the spouse is on covered active duty (or has been notified of an
impending call or order to covered active duty) in the Armed Forces; or to care for
a spouse who is a covered service member.[54]
The FMLA defines “spouse” as “a husband or wife, as the case may be.”[55] The
corresponding DOL regulations define “spouse” as “a husband or wife as defined
or recognized under State law for purposes of marriage in the State where the
employee resides, including common law marriage in States where it is
recognized.”[56] While this regulation suggests that the DOL would look to state
law to define “spouse,” the DOL acknowledged in a 1998 Opinion Letter that it was
bound by DOMA’s definition of “spouse,” concluding, “Because FMLA is a Federal
law, it is our interpretation that only the Federal definition of marriage and spouse
as established under DOMA may be recognized for FMLA leave
purposes.”[57] Until Windsor, then, married same-sex couples who resided in
states that recognized their marriages were ineligible to take FMLA leave to care
for a spouse as permitted by the FMLA. In light of guidance provided by the DOL
for employee benefit plans, and Secretary Perez’s comments, it is reasonable to
expect that the DOL will adopt a “state of celebration” rule for purposes of the
FMLA similar to that adopted for ERISA and the tax code.
In striking down Section 3 of DOMA, the Supreme Court cleared the way for each
state to decide its own definition of “spouse.” Windsor makes clear that if an
employee is married to a same-sex partner and lives in a state that recognizes
same-sex marriage, the employee will be entitled to take FMLA leave for a spouse
as permitted by the FMLA. What Windsor left unclear, however, is how the FMLA
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will be applied to employees who reside in states that do not recognize same-sex
marriage.
As an initial matter, the relevant FMLA regulation references the state in which the
employee resides to determine whether a person is a spouse for purposes of the
FMLA. Therefore, even if the employee formerly lived or was married in a state
that recognized the same-sex marriage, the employee is unlikely to be considered
a spouse in the “new” state for purposes of the FMLA unless the new state
recognizes the marriage (as New York did at the time of Spyer’s death).
To date the DOL has issued only limited guidance on how Windsor will impact the
definition of “spouse” in states that do not recognize same-sex marriage. In August
2013, the DOL updated its FMLA Fact Sheets to reflect that the definition of
“spouse” under the FMLA also includes those individuals who have entered into a
same-sex marriage. Specifically, the Fact Sheets define “spouse” as “a husband or
wife as defined or recognized under state law for purposes of marriage in the state
where the employee resides, including ‘common law’ marriage and same-sex
marriage.”[58] The DOL also indicated that the 1998 Opinion Letter discussing the
application of DOMA to the FMLA is “under review” in light of Windsor.[59]
As noted above, Governor Quinn has now signed SB10 and Illinois will become the
sixteenth state to allow same-sex marriage, starting on June 1, 2014.[60] For
purposes of the FMLA, therefore, same-sex married couples in Illinois, including
those residing in Illinois who were lawfully married in another jurisdiction, will be
entitled to the spousal leave benefits guaranteed by the FMLA when the Act
becomes effective.
While the most widespread impact of Windsor with respect to employment law
will be with the FMLA, other employment statutes are also affected. For
example, Windsor broadens the reach of the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA).[61] GINA prohibits discrimination based
on genetic information by employers and other covered entities having 15 or more
employees.[62] Specifically, the statute forbids an employer or other covered
entity from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information of an
employee or a family member of the employee.[63] GINA defines “family member”
as a “dependent,” and references ERISA’s definition of that term.[64] The
referenced provision of ERISA deals with special enrollment periods for health
insurance coverage, including when an individual becomes a dependent through
marriage.[65] Since GINA expressly incorporates a definition of “family member”
from federal law that uses the terms “marriage” and “spouse,” the definition will
be broadened to include same-sex spouses in states that recognize such marriages
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as a result of Windsor. Consequently, it is now a violation of GINA to request,
require, or purchase genetic information with respect to same-sex spouse of an
employee in states where same-sex marriage is allowed.
In addition, Windsor will result in same-sex spouses being excluded from coverage
under certain federal laws.[66] For example, the National Labor Relations Act
excludes from its definition of employee “any individual employed by his . . .
spouse.”[67] As a result, these individuals are no longer entitled to organize or to
engage in collective bargaining. Similarly, the Fair Labor Standards Act exempts
from coverage “any establishment that has as its only regular employees the owner
thereof or the . . . spouse . . . of such owner.”[68]
VI.

CONCLUSION

We expect 2014 to be a busy year for federal agencies and employee benefits
specialists alike, as additional regulatory guidance is issued. In particular,
additional federal guidance is expected on the retroactivity of
the Windsor decision, and it is always possible that additional state legislative or
court action will modify the legal landscape governing same-sex marriage even
further. There will certainly be growing pains along the way, but the hope is always
that compliance becomes second-nature in due time.
[1] United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675(2013).
[2] 750, ILL COMP STAT. 80/1-80/997 (effective June 1, 2014) (legislative
history available at: http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum= 00
10&GAID=12&GA=98&DocTypeID=SB&LegID=68375&SessionID=85&Spec
Sess=).
[3] Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738C and 1 U.S.C. § 7).
[4] Id. at 2683 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 7).
[5] Id.
[6] See Wage and Hour Division of United Stated Department of Labor, Letter
FMLA-98 (November 18, 1998), <http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FMLA/pri
or2002/FMLA-98.htm> (stating that under the FMLA the term spouse can only
apply to opposite sex couples).
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[7] See Employee Benefits Security Administration, Advisory Opinion 200105A, Fn. 3 (June 1, 2001), <http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/aos/ao2001-05a.
html> (stating that a non-spousal domestic partner cannot qualify as a spouse for
any purpose under federal law).
[8] See Internal Revenue Service, Private Letter Ruling 9850011 (December 11,
1998), 1998 WL 855396 (stating that for the purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code, a same-sex domestic partner does not qualify as a spouse).
[9] Id.
[10] The 13 states that recognized same-sex marriage at the time of
the Windsor decision were California (originally recognized in In Re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 433-34 (Cal. 2008); reversed by California Proposition 8 in
2008, Cal.Const. Art. 1, § 7.5; subsequently re- recognized in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal 2008) and Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2668 (finding petitioners did not have standing to appeal
the decision of the N.D. of California to either the Ninth Circuit or the Supreme
Court).), Connecticut (Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Public Heath, 957 A.2d 407, 481-82
(Conn. 2008).), Delaware ( DEL. CODE tit. 13, § 101.), Iowa ( Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 906-07 (Iowa 2009).), Maine ( ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 650-A.),
Maryland ( MD. CODE, FAM. LAW § 2-201.), Massachusetts (Goodridge v. Dep’t of
Public Health, 708 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003).), Minnesota ( MINN.
STAT. §§ 517.01 and 517.03.), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1 and
457:1-A.), New York (N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney).), Rhode Island
(R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1.), Vermont ( VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8.), and Washington
( WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010.). Illinois (750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212 (effective
June 1, 2014).), New Jersey (Garden State Equality v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036 (N.J.
2013).), New Mexico (Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013), and Hawaii
( HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.) have since recognized same-sex marriage
through legislation or court decisions.
[11] The states with constitutional bans on same-sex marriage are Alaska
(AK CONST. Art. 1, § 25), Alabama (ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03.), Arkansas (ARK.
CONST. amend. 83, § 1.), Arizona (ARIZ. CONST. art. 30, § 1.), Colorado (COLO.
CONST. art. 2, § 31.), Florida (FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.), Georgia (GA. CONST. art. 1, §
4, ¶ I.), Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28.), Kansas (KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16.),
Kentucky (KY. CONST. § 233A.), Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. 12, § 15.), Michigan
(MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25.), Mississippi (MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 263A.), Missouri
(MO. CONST. art. 1, § 33.), Montana (MONT. CONST. art. 13, § 7.), Nebraska (NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 29.), Nevada (NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 21.), North Carolina
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(N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 6.), North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. 11, § 28.), Ohio (OHIO
CONST. art. XV, § 11.), Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 35.), Oregon (OR.
CONST. art. XV, § 5a.), South Carolina (S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15.), South Dakota
(S.D. CONST. art. 21, § 9.), Tennessee (TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 18.), Texas (TEX.
CONST. ART. 1, § 32.), UTAH (UTAH CONST. ART. 1, § 29.), VIRGINIA (VA. CONST. ART. 1,
§ 15-A.), AND WISCONSIN (WIS. CONST. ART. 13, § 13.).
[12] Alabama ( ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03.), Arkansas (ARK. CONST. amend. 83, §
2.), Florida (FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.), Georgia (GA. CONST. art. 1, § 4, ¶ I.), Idaho
(IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28.), Kansas (KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16.), Kentucky (KY.
CONST. § 233A.), Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. 12, § 15.), Michigan (MICH. CONST. art.
1, § 25.), Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29.), North Carolina (N.C. CONST. art. XIV,
§ 6.), South Carolina (S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15.), South Dakota (S.D. CONST. art.
21, § 9.), Texas (TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 32.), Utah (UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 29.), Virginia
(VA. CONST. art. 1, § 15-A.), and Wisconsin (WIS. CONST. art. 13, § 13.) have
constitutional amendments banning other types of same-sex civil unions.
[13] The six states, in addition to Puerto Rico (P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 221.), were
Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (2012, amended 2013).), Illinois (750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/212 (current version effective until May 31,2014).), Indiana (IND. CODE §
31-11-1-1.), Pennsylvania (23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.), West Virginia (W. VA. CODE §
48-2-104.), and Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101.). Illinois (750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/212 (effective June 1, 2014) and Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1.) have
since passed legislation that will permit same-sex marriage.
[14] 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 75/1-75/90.
[15] Id. at 75/20.
[16] Id. at 75/60 (effective until June 1, 2014).
[17] Illinois Department of Insurance, Civil Unions and Insurance Benefits, 2
(May 2011), <http://www.insurance.illinois.gov/newsrls/2011/05/CivilUnions
Final05-25-11.pdf>.
[18] See Internal Revenue Service, Private Letter Ruling 9850011 (December 11,
1998), 1998 WL 855396 (stating that a domestic partner may qualify as a
dependent if certain criteria are met and therefore health benefits paid by the
employer would not be included in gross income).
[19] United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681, 2695-96 (2013).
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[20] Id. at 2683.
[21] Id. at 2682.
[22] Id. at 2683-84. The procedural posture of this case was unusual, as the Court
recognized. While the district court suit was pending, the Attorney General
announced that the President would no longer defend DOMA’s constitutionality.
At the same time, however, the Department of Justice announced the President’s
intention to continue enforcing DOMA. In the wake of the Attorney General’s
announcement, the House of Representative’s Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group
(BLAG) sought to intervene in theproceedings as an interested party. In its
opinion, the Supreme Court addressed whether the U.S. Government and/or
BLAG had standing to appeal to the Second Circuit and later seek certiorari. Over
the vehement dissent of Justice Scalia, the Court ultimately determined that it
could proceed on the merits. Id.
[23] Id. at 2691.
[24] Id. at 2692.
[25] Id. at 2690.
[26] Id. at 2692.
[27] Id. at 2693.
[28] Id. (referring to H.R.Rep. No. 104-664, pp. 12-13 (1996)).
[29] Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States Dept. of Health and Human
Servs., 682 F. 3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2012)).
[30] Id. (quoting Dep’t of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)).
[31] Id. at 2694. See 5 U.S.C. §§8901(5), 8905; 11 U.S.C. §§101(14A), 507(a)(1)(A),
523(a)(5), 523(a)(15); National Cemetery Administration Directive 3210/1, at 37
(June 4, 2008).
[32] Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
[33] Id. at 2696.
[34] Id.
[35] 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 80/10(a).
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[36] Id. 80/10(c).
[37] Id. 80/10(d).
[38] Id. 75/65.
[39] I.R.S. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/rr-13-17.pdf>.
[40] U.S. Dept.of Labor, Technical Release 2013-14, Guidance to Employee Benefit
Plans on the Definition of “Spouse” and “Marriage” under ERISA and the Supreme
Court’s Decision in United States v. Windsor (Sept. 18, 2013), <http://www.dol.
gov/ebsa/newsroom/tr13-04.html>.
[41] I.R.S. Notice 2013-61, “Application of Windsor Decision and Rev. Rul. 201317 to Employment Taxes and Special Administrative Procedures for Employers to
Make Adjustments or Claims for Refund or Credit,” (Sept. 23, 2013), <http://www.
irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-13-61.pdf>.
[42] I.R.S. Notice 2014-1, “Sections 125 and 223 – Cafeteria Plans, Flexible
Spending Arrangements, and Health Savings Accounts – Elections and
Reimbursements for Same-Sex Spouses Following the Windsor Supreme Court
Decision,” (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-01.pdf.
[43] DOL Technical Release 2013-14; IRS Rev. Rul. 2013-17.
[44] U.S. D.O.L, E.B.S.A. News Release, New guidance issued by US Labor
Department on same-sex marriages and employee benefit plans, (Sept. 18, 2013),
<http://www.dol. gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/EBSA20131720.htm>.
[45] 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1).
[46] IRS Rev. Rul. 2013-17.
[47] See generally I.R.C. § 152.
[48] IRS, Private Letter Ruling 200108010 (Nov. 17, 2000).
[49] See May 7-9, 2009 American Bar Association Joint Committee on Employee
Benefits Meeting, Q&A 2.
[50] I. R. C.§ 4980B(d)(2).
[51] 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1).
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[52] See 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-1.
[53] I.R.S., Answers to Frequently Asked Questions for Individuals of the Samesex Who are Married Under State Law, Q&A 16 (last reviewed Nov. 20, 2013),
<http://www.irs.gov/uac/Answers-to-Frequently-Asked-Questions-for-SameSex-Married-Couples>.
[54] 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a)(1), 2612(a)(3).
[55] 29 U.S.C. § 2611(13).
[56] 29 C.F.R. § 825.102.
[57] DOL Op. Ltr. FMLA 98 (Nov. 18, 1998), available at <http://www.
dol.gov/WHD/opinion/FMLA/prior2002/FMLA-98.htm>. However, this may
change, as the web page states, as of February 2, 2014, “This letter is under review
in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in UNITED STATES v. WINDSOR,
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF SPYER, ET AL., which held the referenced
provision in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) to be unconstitutional.”
[58] See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Labor, Fact Sheet #28F: Qualifying Reasons for Leave
under the Family and Medical Leave Act, available at: <http://www.dol.
gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs28f.htm>.
[59] DOL Op. Ltr. FMLA-98 (Nov. 18, 1998), available at: <http://www.dol.
gov/WHD/opinion/FMLA/prior2002/FMLA-98.htm>.
[60] 5 Ill.Comp. Stat. 75/2.
[61] Pub.L. 110-233 (2008), condified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-10.
[62] Id. §§ 2000ff((2)(B),(C).
[63] Id. §§ 2000ff-1(b), 200055-2(b), 2000ff-3(b), 2000ff-4(b).
[64] Id. §§ 2000ff(3)(A),(B) (referencing section 701(f)(2) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §
1181(f)(2).
[65] Section 701(f)(2) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1181(f)(2).
[66] U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT 5, 32 (GAO/OGC97-16) (1997), available at: <www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf>.
[67] 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By, Student Editorial Board:
Marco Berrios, Peter Brierton, Alec Hausermann, and Stephanie
Ridella
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the
public employee collective bargaining statutes.
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Arbitrability

In Harlem Federation of Teachers, Local 540, IFT-AFT, AFL-CIO, and Harlem
School District No. 122, 30 PERI ¶ 153 (IELRB 2013), the Union filed a grievance,
claiming that several reductions in force, position eliminations and other district
reorganizations violated the collective bargaining agreement, and that the School
District should be compelled to arbitrate. The School District contended that the
collective bargaining agreements provided that the arbitrator did not have the
authority to decide any question within the responsibility of the Board of
Education to decide, and that the decisions made were within the inherent
managerial authority of the Board.
The IELRB concluded that the issues were arbitrable. The IELRB reasoned that a
management rights clause does not mean a grievance is inarbitrable, as the
meaning of that clause within the agreement is a matter of interpretation for the
arbitrator to determine. The collective bargaining agreements themselves
contained a number of provisions that touched upon the decisions made in
reorganizing the district. The arbitration provisions in the collective bargaining
agreements were susceptible to an interpretation that covers the parties’
disputes. The function of the IELRB was not to weigh the merits of the grievance
and the merits must not be considered in deciding whether grievances are
arbitrable; even frivolous claims can be susceptible to interpretation favoring
arbitration.
The School District argued the grievance over reductions in force and
reorganization were inarbitrable because Section 10-23.5 of the School Code
provided that a school district has the power to “employ such educational support
personnel employees as it deems advisable and to define their employment duties,”
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and provides procedures to reduce the number of employees and eliminate
programs. However, the IELRB said the statute does not render the grievances
inarbitrable because, while it “grants school districts the power to define the
employment duties of educational support employees, it does not provide that
these decisions are within the sole discretion of the school district.” Other aspects
of the employment relationship are not covered under the statute, such
as employee work year or hours, but are subject to collective bargaining, and thus
the issues are arbitrable.
B.

Duty to Provide Information

In Board of Education of City of Chicago v. IELRB, 2013 Ill. App. (1st) 122447, the
First District Appellate Court reversed the IELRB and held that the School Board
was not obligated under the IELRA to release student records to the union for use
in a grievance proceeding. A school security officer was terminated after being
accused of starting altercations with two students. During the grievance
proceedings, the union argued that the first alleged altercation did not happen and
that the second was started by the student, who had violent tendencies and was
later expelled because of a fight with school staff.
The dispute went to arbitration and the School Board denied the Union’s request
for the students’ redacted disciplinary records. The School Board refused to
comply with the arbitrator’s subpoena, although it indicated it would comply with
a court order. Rather than file in court, the Union filed an unfair labor practice
charge, and proceeded with the arbitration. In arbitration, the employee was
reinstated.
The unfair labor practice charge alleged that the School Board’s refusal to provide
the student records violated its duty under the IELRA to bargain in good faith with
employee representatives. The School Board responded that under the Illinois
Student Records Act it could only turn over those records pursuant to a court
order. The IELRB found that the request for redacted records mitigated
confidentiality concerns for the students, and found that the School Board
committed an unfair labor practice.
On appeal, the court reversed. The court observed that the duty to provide
information upon request, while a part of the obligation to bargain in good faith, is
not absolute; the information must be “relevant to the proceedings and reasonably
necessary to the union’s performance of its responsibilities.” Furthermore,
employers may assert an affirmative defense to production, such as confidentiality

WINTER 2014 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

25

or employee privacy. As a matter of first impression in published Illinois decisions,
the court examined the merits of a statutory defense to production.
Examining the Student Records Act, the court first held that redacted student
records, despite the removal of individual information, were still protected student
records because they are still sought to gain information about two individual
students. Although the students would be identified by initials rather than names,
the union would know who they were. The court distinguished cases involving
overall statistical information in which individual students could not be identified.
Section 6 of the Student Records Act requires a court order before student records
may be disclosed, and the rights of parents and students do not yield to the duty to
bargain in good faith. The court saw “no basis upon which to conclude that the
union’s need for student records, under any and all circumstances, takes
precedence over the right of parents to notice and the opportunity to challenge the
release of their child’s records.”
C.

Employee Reclassifications

In International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 399 v. IELRB, 2013 IL App
(1st) 122432-U), the First District Appellate Court upheld the IELRB’s dismissal of
the union’s claim alleging that Western Illinois University had violated sections
14(1) and 14(5) of the IELRA by failing to apply the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) to employees who had received a new job
classification removing them from the bargaining unit and who were returned to
the bargaining unit at a later date.
“Maintenance workers” were added to the job classification portion of the
collective bargaining agreement in April 1991. This term continued to be part of
the agreement when a new CBA was negotiated in July 2010 that was effective
August 1, 2009 until July 31, 2014. Maintenance workers were tasked with
removing asbestos and installing heat and frost insulation. By January 2010,
however, a large portion of the work was installation of heat/frost insulation. As a
result, six employees were reclassified as “building heat/frost insulators,” and were
treated by the university as unrepresented prevailing rate employees. They
received a $3 increase in hourly pay, a 15 minute paid morning break, increased
shift differential (from $.70 to $1), and lost their 30 minute paid lunch (cutting
their weekly hours from 40 to 37.5). On November 8, 2010, the union petitioned
the IELRB to add heating and frost insulators to the bargaining unit; the IELRB
granted the petition. In February 2011 the union asked the university to apply the
current CBA terms, including the paid lunch, to the heating and frost insulators.
The university refused saying it was only obligated to maintain the status quo for
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the newly classified employees until terms of employment could be negotiated. The
university offered to bargain with the union but no negotiations occurred. The
union filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that Western Illinois University
had violated sections 14(1) and 14(5) of the IELRA by failing to apply the terms of
the CBA to employees who had requested a new job classification removing them
from the bargaining unit and who were added back to the bargaining unit at a later
date.
The court held that although the employees’ job duties remained relatively the
same, their job classification did not. The court cited to Federal Mogul Corp., 209
N.L.R.B. 343 (1974) in holding that just as it was unfair to apply the current CBA
to newly added employees, it would also be unfair to require the university to apply
the current CBA to newly classified employees who had previously not been
represented by the union without additional bargaining. The court held that until
the parties engage in collective bargaining the university is not permitted to apply
the terms of the existing CBA to the heat and frost insulators and is required to
maintain the status quo.
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Peace Officers and Security Personnel

In Board of Education of Peoria School. District No. 150 v. Peoria Federation of
Support Staff, Security/Policeman’s Benevolent and Protective Ass’n Unit, 2013
IL 114853, 998 N.E.2d 36, the Illinois Supreme Court held unconstitutional Public
Act 96-1257 which had removed peace officers employed by a school district on the
effective date of the act from coverage under the IELRA and placed them under the
IPLRA. One effect of this act was to deny such employees the right to strike and to
grant them the right to interest arbitration. As of the effective date of the act,
Peoria School District 150 was the only school district in the state to employ its
own peace officers in its own police department.
The court held that the act contravened the Illinois Constitution’s prohibition of
special legislation. The court interpreted the act to apply only to those school
districts employing peace officers in their own police departments on the act’s
effective date and not to apply to school districts that might establish police
departments and employ peace officers in the future. Examining the act’s purpose
to ensure that police officers are not allowed to strike no matter who employs them,
the court found the act’s distinction between the one school district who employed
peace officers on the effective date of the act and school districts who might employ
peace officers in the future lacked any rational justification.
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In Metropolitan Alliance of Police, River Valley Detention Center, Chapter 228 v.
ILRB, 2013 IL App (3d) 120308, 1N.E.3d 593, the Third District Appellate Court,
affirmed the ILRB State Panel’s holding that the River Valley Juvenile Detention
Center (“RJDC”) was not a correctional facility and its supervisors were therefore
not security personnel entitled to interest arbitration. The union which
represented shift and nonline supervisors engaged RJDC in negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement. Mediation failed to produce any results and the
union demanded interest arbitration which the employer refused. The union filed
an unfair labor practice charge.
Evidence during the hearing showed that the RJDC is not governed by the Illinois
Department of Corrections (“IDOC”); the residents are not in IDOC custody; the
RJDC used IDOC procedures though; the RJDC contained males and females aged
10 to 16; residents could be admitted through a court order or through either an
arresting officer’s or department’s recommendation and a subsequent evaluation
by RJDC staff in order to determine if admittance is proper, which in turn would
lead to a detention hearing where a court would determine if there was probable
cause for delinquency; the vast majority of the residents were awaiting the
disposition of their cases; shift supervisors were responsible for maintaining the
secured parts of the RJDC and supervising the juvenile detention officers; the
nonline supervisors included employees such as the court liaison and the program
manager; both types of managers were required to meet the standards set forth by
the Supreme Court and the Probation and Probation Officers Act; and the juvenile
detention officers monitored the health of the residents, oversaw daily activities,
and attended to the emotional needs of the juveniles.
The RJDC is under the oversight of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts
(“AOIC”). The AOIC’s mission is to “improve and enhance the probation court
services field.” The RJDC submits its annual plan and budget to the AOIC, and the
AOIC in part provides the RJDC’s funding. The IDOC does not provide any funding
for the center.
The court looked to the following Illinois laws: the IPLRA defines a security
employee as “an employee who is responsible for the supervision and control of
inmates at correctional facilities;” the Unified Code of Corrections defines
“correctional facility” as “any building or part of a building where committed
persons are kept in a secured manner;” commitment is “a judicially determined
placement in the custody of the Department of Corrections on the basis of
delinquency or conviction;” detention is defined by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
as the temporary care of a minor who is allegedly delinquent and who requires
temporary dentation pending disposition by a court; and the Probation Act defines
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a probation officer as a person employed in probation or court services under the
Probation Act or Juvenile Court Act of 1987 and meets the standards set by the
Supreme Court. An employee who is a probation officer is also considered a judicial
employee.
In affirming the ILRB’s decision the court pointed out that the nature of the
confinement was a critical distinction between RJDC and a corrections facility. The
residents of the RJDC were awaiting adjudication and had not yet been sentenced.
The residents of the RJDC were under a detention order rather than an order of
commitment. The court was also persuaded by the legislative action that created
the Department of Juvenile Justice, which is separate from the IDOC.
Furthermore, the court pointed to the distinction created by the Prohibition Act
that identifies detention staff, but not correctional staff, as probation officers.
Finally, the court pointed out that the RJDC receives its funding and standards
from the AOIC and the employees are hired under circuit’s probation and court
services department. In closing the court stated, “Had the legislature intended the
staff at juvenile detention homes to be considered correctional officers and the
detention homes to be correctional facilities, it would have done so. Instead, the
legislature expressly differentiated between detention homes and correctional
facilities.”

